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Introduction
Outsiders might think the European Union (EU) has grown into a homoge-
neous unit. However, even after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties,
the Union remains a loose organization of states, far from functioning as a
federal entity. It does not have its own government; and the final decision-
making organ, the European Council, remains an assembly composed of
government representatives of sovereign member states. The member
states continue to apprehensively guard their own national interests and
have only handed over their right of sovereignty to the European communi-
ties in specifically delineated areas, thus creating an international organiza-
tion of a very particular kind.
The central element of the European Union is the European Economic
Community (EEC). The EEC was established by the Treaty of Rome in
1957 with the goal of setting up a common market for all of its member
states. This common market was further developed by the Single European
Act of 1986 into an "area without internal frontiers in which the free move-
ment of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured."' Important as
the so-called "internal market" is for the free movement of goods and serv-
ices, its primary significance lies with its effect on two groups, consumers
on the one hand and businesses on the other.
This Article examines the organization of businesses under corporate
law in the European Union. The last thirty years have seen the develop-
ment of a whole body of European regulations which have in part had a
very considerable influence on the corporate law of the individual member
states. These developments have obviously not come to an end, but the
situation has currently reached a point that allows one to take stock of
developments and to see the changes that have already taken place in indi-
vidual corporate laws, and more particularly to examine the changes that
are yet required.
I. Why Is the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Europe Necessary?
A. What is European Corporate Law?
In its White Paper entitled Completing the Internal Market, the Commis-
sion, as a part of the structuring of a single European market, set the task
of creating a suitable legal framework in the field of corporate law for the
facilitation of cross-border cooperation and activities.2 Today, this goal of
achieving a fully operational unified legal framework still has not been
completely realized. On the one hand, "European corporate law" is there-
fore the sum of all Community regulations in the field of corporate law
currently in force and, on the other hand, it is a legislative program.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 Oj. (C 224)
7a [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
2. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET:
WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 35 (1985).
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B. Market Freedoms
The bases for achieving an internal market are the basic freedoms set out
in the EC Treaty. These are the free movement of goods,3 the free move-
ment of persons4 and the free movement of payments and capital.5 The
most important freedoms for corporations are the free movement of per-
sons, the freedom of establishment 6 and the freedom to provide services.
7
1. Freedom of Establishment
The freedom of establishment guarantees the general right to create perma-
nent institutions necessary for the independent operation of business activ-
ities and, in particular, the right to set up corporations.8
Freedom of establishment really only exists when the legal personality
of a corporation in a particular state is also recognized in other member
states. The legal capacity of a corporation is defined in its memorandum
and articles of association. Precise delineation of what exactly these com-
prise is, however, problematic. In Europe, this issue is at present regulated
in two different ways, depending on the legal concepts applied.
The first of these concepts focuses on the initial step of foundation, or
formation. Under the foundation theory, the articles of association are sub-
ject to the laws of the state in which the corporation is established. If a
corporation is established in accordance with the laws of the state in which
it is established, its legality should, according to this theory, also be recog-
nized by other states in which the corporation operates. Its status as a
legally operating entity should also be recognized if the corporation has
"emigrated" to another state.
In contrast, the second concept emphasizes the relevance of the seat of
a corporation. The place of registration theory demands that a corporation
be incorporated in accordance with the laws of the state in which the actual
administrative center of the corporation exists, or the location of the deci-
sion-making center of the corporation. This emphasis on the place of regis-
tration has the effect of restricting the freedom of movement of
corporations.
Because various member states within the EU have taken different
positions- on the recognition of international norms relating to corporate
law, corporations in the EU face potentially conflicting conditions with
respect to their freedom of movement, depending on the state in which the
corporation was established and the state to which it intends to relocate. I
will return to this point at a later stage.
3. EC Treaty arts. 9-36.
4. Id. arts. 48-66.
5. Id. arts. 67-73(h).
6. Id. arts. 52-58.
7. Id. arts. 59-66.
8. Id. art. 52(2).
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2. Competitive Equality for Persons Operating in the Common Market
From a corporation's point of view, corporate laws regulating liability
necessitate the use of services (such as auditing and notarization) that
require the establishment of certain corporate organs or the deployment of
certain personnel. As a result, these corporate laws amount to operational
cost factors. In this sense, they are important "location factors." Under-
standably, no goals have been set to create identical location conditions
throughout the European Union in relation to financial matters such as the
costs of real estate, transport or other comparable economic factors. If,
however, differences arise that are not only attributable to local conditions
or to a state's tax regime, but also to different corporate law regulations for
what are essentially the same economic facts, this can result in an inequal-
ity in competition conditions for businesses. This is not compatible with
article 7a of the EC Treaty,9 which calls for the creation of an economic
area without internal frontiers.
C. Competing legal systems?
One can ask, however, whether it is really necessary for the creation of an
internal market to harmonize national corporate laws and create suprana-
tional corporate structures. Perhaps European legal harmonization dimin-
ishes the benefits of competition between the different legal systems.
Competition between legal systems may ascertain, over time, which system
proves to be the most sensible and practical. The American system illus-
trates such competition. There are fifty different legal systems in the
United States, and difficulties seldom arise when working between the dif-
ferent corporate laws. The uniform U.S. market allows different legal sys-
tems to coexist without suffering from the results.
There are, however, major differences between the United States and
the European Union that must be taken into account when considering
this question. Apart from the special case of Louisiana, the legal systems of
the individual states in the United States have their shared basis in the
common law. They share a similar legal culture, and legal training in indi-
vidual states is almost identical. Despite differences in finer details, corpo-
rate law is therefore quite similar. Moreover, some sections of the law
regulating capital markets are under federal control and apply to all states
in the same way.
The situation in the European Union is entirely different. The legal
systems of the member states belong to different families of law. Some
legal systems are based on common law and others on civil law. In the civil
law systems, both the Roman and Germanic legal traditions are repre-
sented. And until recently, there were absolutely no Europe-wide regula-
tions concerning capital markets.
For this reason, the conditions for a healthy competition of legal sys-
tems did not exist in Europe in the area of corporate law, and they still do
not today. Furthermore, as mentioned already, the member states of the
9. EC Treaty art. 7a.
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European Union follow different models when dealing with conflicts of
corporate law regimes. Some states adhere to the place of registration the-
ory, and others base their law on the foundation theory. Businesses wish-
ing to operate in states where the place of registration theory applies must
take all the advantages and disadvantages of the local legal system into con-
sideration when deciding on the issue of location. 10 Businesses can only
operate under a legal regime other than the one applicable in their state of
location in which they are located if the foundation theory applies. As far
as I am aware, all of the U.S. states follow the foundation theory, and this
fact alone shows clearly the fundamental differences between the United
States and the European Union.
In addition, one of the substantial weaknesses of competition between
corporate law systems is that it may attract a member state to follow a
policy of systematic corporate law deregulation with the goal of attracting
as many businesses as possible to that country." In Europe, this phenom-
enon has been labeled the "Delaware Effect" due to similar developments
that have taken place in the United States. Systematic deregulation risks a
decrease in the quality of corporate law, particularly with respect to the
protection of creditors and minority shareholders. In contrast to the
United States, this danger has not yet been contained in Europe by
enabling adequate protective regulations in the laws governing the capital
markets and stock exchange transactions.
Unrestricted competition between the various systems of corporate
law is for these reasons not the right answer for Europe. A controlled har-
monization of corporate laws with the aim of making corporate law a neu-
tral competitive factor in the decision of corporate location would appear to
be the more sensible way forward.
II. Forms of Harmonization of Corporate Law in the EU
Harmonization has always been the goal of the European Commission,
which has endeavored to create a legal framework for corporations operat-
ing in a single market that facilitates cooperation and business activity. Its
efforts have concentrated on four main areas:
(1) harmonization of national corporate law regimes with respect to
content;
(2) mutual recognition of national corporations in the individual member
states of the European Union;
(3) creation of the legal possibility for national corporations of merging
with corporations from other European countries and of transferring
their seat from one country to another and ensuring that the conditions
10. Wolfgang Sch6n, Mindestharmonisierung im europaischen Gesellschaftsrecht, 160
ZHR (ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELsREcHT uND WIRTScHAFrSRECHT) 220, 235
(1996).
11. Hanno Merkt, Das Europaische Gesellschaftsrecht und die Idee des "Wettbewerbs
der Gesetzgeber," 59 RABELsZ (RABELs ZmTScHRiFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATION-
ALES PRiVATREcHT) 545, 549 fl. (1995).
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under which these steps are possible are practical - also from a taxa-
tion point of view;
(4) creation of forms of supranational corporations.
The EC Treaty offers three ways to standardize or harmonize laws: agree-
ments under article 220 of the EC Treaty, regulations, and directives. Brief
explanations of each follow.
Under article 220 of the EC Treaty, agreements are international law
agreements that are signed by individual member states and that supersede
any opposing national law; the rules entailed address the individual citi-
zens of states ratifying the agreement. Under article 189(2) of the EC
Treaty, regulations are generally and directly applicable in all member
states. They are enacted by the Council. Regulations are binding on citi-
zens of all of the member states of the European Community. A European
regulation takes priority over national law. Directives, also enacted by the
Council, are directed at national legislatures of member states. They
require the legislatures to implement their contents into national law by
passing appropriate legislation. The legislature has some flexibility in the
choice of form and methods for implementation of the goals described in
the directive. A directive is thereby a flexible rule that has no binding effect
in total, only the goal to be achieved is binding. 12 A directive gives member
states a degree of flexibility when embedding its goals into their national
legislation, allowing them to take the requirements of their own particular
legal systems and their own legal terminology into consideration.13 Each
of these three forms of European legislation arise in the area of corporate
law, though in varying degrees of frequency. Agreements do not play a role
in European corporate law. To date, there has only been one agreement,
which was made in 1968 and deals with the mutual recognition of corpora-
tions and legal persons within the EU.1 4 However, not enough member
states have ratified the agreement, so that it can now be considered to be
obsolete.1 5 Regulations, legal acts with direct application in the entire area
of the European Union, are of greater importance. I shall come back to
elaborate on this point in a moment.
The vast majority of Community legislative measures in the area of
corporate law are directives, legal acts directed at member states binding
them to implement the contents into national law. Directives are at the core
of the legal framework for a Europe-wide harmonization of corporate law.
They are based on the special rules found in article 54(3)(g) and article
12. Hans-Wolfram Daig, Gemeinsame Vorschriften ffir mehrere Organe, in 2 KOM-
MENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG: ARTnHEL 137-248 536-87, 551 (Groeben et al. eds., 1983).
Gudrun Schmidt, Gemeinsame Vorschriften far mehrere Organe, in 4 KOMMENTAR ZUM
EU/EG-VERTRG art. 189 Rn. 24, 36-38 (Hans von der Groeben et al. eds., 1997).
13. Christiaan W. Timmermans, Die europaische Rechtsangleichung in Gesellschaft-
srecht, 48 RABELsZ (RABELs ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVA-
TRFcHT) 1, 10 (1984).
14. BGBL. II (BUNDESGESEIZBLATT TaIL II) 370 (1972).
15. Dauses/Behrens, HANDBUCH DES EG-WRTscHrAI smcHTs E.11I at 116 (Manfred A.
Dauses ed., 1988 ss).
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57(2)(1) of the EC Treaty and the general rules of articles 100-102 of the
EC Treaty.
Article 54(3)(G) of the EC Treaty states:
The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving upon
them... by coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for
the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Mem-
ber States of corporations or firms ... with a view to making such safe-
guards equivalent throughout the Community.
The wording "necessary extent" is of particular importance in this context.
To date, fourteen directives and proposals for directives have dealt with
the harmonization of substantive corporate law in the member states of the
European Union. Nine directives have already been enacted, and five are
still in the preparatory stages, as preliminary drafts.16 The directives
already enacted deal with the rules of public disclosure, the foundation of
corporations, the protection of capital in corporate provisions, representa-
tive authority of managerial bodies, the submission of accounts (including
accounts for final audits), and corporate mergers and divestitures (splits).
The laws regulating the certification of incorporation of stock corpora-
tions, the responsibilities of corporate organs, codetermination (represen-
tation of labor on a corporation's supervisory board), and groups of
corporations are examples of areas that still must be addressed.
III. European and National Law
European legislation has dearly changed national corporate law in many
areas, particularly thanks to the harmonization measures that have altered
the corporate law of member states. Work is in progress to create new
forms of supranational corporations that will give corporations operating
on a Europe-wide basis a standardized organizational framework. Because
these new corporate forms will be introduced under a uniform law, regula-
tions enacted by the Commission are the most appropriate instrument to
effect this change.
A. Standardized Corporate Forms in Europe
There has been one successful project to date in relation to the creation of
uniform corporate forms within Europe; however, several other projects
have not been successful.
1. European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIG)
The only Europe-wide uniform corporate form that currently exists is the
European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIG). It is an instrument for
cooperation and serves to support the economic activities of its members.
16. Peter M. Wiesner, Stand des Europdischen Unternehmensrechts, 6 EuZW
(EuRoPAISCHE ZEITSCHRFwr FOp WiRTscHAFTsREcHT) 821, 824 (1995); Dauses/Behrens,
supra note 15, at 18.
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In this respect, it carries features of a cooperative 17 and is based on the
model of the French groupement d'inter~t dconomique. The EEIG Regulation
only covers the legal frame, which is then supplemented by national law.
In Germany, for example, this supplementary function is performed by the
Implementary Act for the EEIG Regulation and, subsidiarily, the provisions
relating to General Partnerships (the so-called "OHG") contained in the
Commercial Code. The legal rules to be applied in Germany are, thus,
found in four different sources of law: The EEIG Regulation, the Imple-
mentary Act for the EEIG Regulation, the Commercial Code, and the Civil
Code, which contains the basic rules governing partnerships. Thus, appli-
cation of the EEIG Regulation is not made particularly easy.
The EEIG corporate form deliberately does not address several critical
areas that have so far proved an obstacle to agreement on the creation of a
European Stock Corporation. This affects, in particular, the issue of
codetermination. The upper limit for the number of employees in an EEIG
is 500, thus avoiding the whole question of codetermination, which only
arises in larger corporate entities.
The EEIG is gaining popularity in the European Union.18 It is espe-
cially favored by self-employed persons for cross-border cooperation.
2. European Stock Corporation
The European Stock Corporation - Societas Europaea (SE) - has, so far,
met with little success. This is the oldest project directed at creating a stan-
dardized corporate form in Europe for cross-border business operations.
After preliminary considerations beginning in 1959, the Commission
produced the first draft for a statute of a European Stock Corporation in
1970. A second draft followed in 1975. Both drafts regulated in detail the
administrative structure of the SE, the rules of codetermination, the law in
relation to group corporations, the law regulating the accounting of an SE
and even several points concerning taxation. The 1975 draft, however, was
rejected by the Council of Ministers. The Commission presented a com-
pletely new draft in 1989 that was clearly different from both of its previ-
ous submissions. In this new effort, the Commission moved away from the
idea of creating a purely supranational legal form unaffected by national
regulations, and instead the draft included many references to national
law. At this stage, it was much easier to give national laws a role than it
had been in the previous drafts dating back to 1970 and 1975, because a
much higher degree of harmonization had been achieved since the first
drafting attempts. The draft statute was divided into the actual statute of
the SE (article 100 of the EC Treaty being the legal basis) and a draft direc-
tive for codetermination (article 54 of the EC Treaty). The Commission
17. Jens Rinze, Die Europiische Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung - eine genossen-
schaftliche Rechtsform europaischen Rechts, in AKrUELLE PROBLEME DER GENOSSENSCHAFTEN
111 (BerndJ6stingmeier ed., 1994).
18. In the beginning of 1997 there have been 722 EEIG in Europe. See Hans-Werner
Neye, Neue europdische Initiative in Gesellschaftsrecht, GMBHR (GMBH-RurNscHAU) R 97
(1997).
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tried in this way to avoid the procedural requirement that the Council
adopt regulations by unanimous votes. 19
In 1991, the Commission presented a modified proposal. The tech-
nique of making use of cross-references to national laws characteristic of
the 1989 draft was further developed, and independent rules were further
reduced. The division into an actual draft statute and a directive on
codetermination was retained. With regard to corporate structure, member
states are free to opt for either the monist or dualist model. No less than
four options are available for codetermination. In the 1991 draft, regula-
tions governing corporation groups were completely dropped.
The 1991 draft was also unsuccessful. Due to the very different opin-
ions on codetermination, all drafts to date have failed. For some time it
appeared that the Commission had given up all plans with resignation, but
adoption of the "Euro Staff Committee Directive"20 has provided a new
impulse. In a statement issued in November 1995, the Commission devel-
oped new options for the SE in which codetermination is separated from
the legally defined organizational structure of the corporation and replaced
by an information and consultation procedure along the lines developed by
the Euro Staff Committee Directive. 21 Reactions in Germany to this
approach have, however, not been very positive.22
3. Further Suggestions Made in 1992
In 1992, the Commission presented three further proposals based on arti-
cle 100a of the EC Treaty for regulations pertaining to uniform European
corporation forms. European Associations, European Cooperatives, and the
European Mutual Corporations all came under consideration. When and in
what form these entities will emerge as legally available options remains
open.
B. Harmonization of National Law
Of clearly greater importance to national legal systems than the endeavor
to establish supranational corporation forms are the directives leading to
noticeable reforms in several areas of corporate law. This section discusses
the main points involved.
1. Public Disclosure
Public disclosure is an area that the Commission tackled at an early stage.
A large number of directives exist in this area, the main policy goal of
which is to secure third party protection and create contractual certainty
19. EC Treaty art. 235.
20. ABI. EG (AmrsBIA-rr DER EUROPAISCHEN GmEviINsc1mN) No. L 254 from
30.9.1994, at 64.
21. Cf. Martina R. Deckert, Europaisches Gesellschaftsrecht - Eine Zwischenbilanz, 35
DSTR (DEUTSCHES SThUERRECHT) 874, 878 (1997).
22. Walter Kolvenbach, Neue Initiative zur Weiterentwicklung des Europaischen Gesell-
schaftsrechts?, 7 EuZW 229, 232 (1996); Peter Behrens, Krisensymplome in der Gesell-
schaftrechtsangleichung, 7 EuZW 193 (1996).
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within the Union. The parties to a contract involving a corporation operat-
ing within the EU should not be confronted with unexpected surprises in
relation to, for example, the legal legitimacy of a corporation's existence,
the validity of the obligations agreed to by the corporation, its creditworthi-
ness, the extent of security provided by its share capital, or the reliability of
the annual financial report. As early as 1968, the rules of public disclosure
as a means of achieving third party protection were, to a certain extent, the
subject of the first directive on corporate law.23 They prescribe the intro-
duction of publicly accessible registers and the publication of certain data
in official notifications for all member states. They set out the documents
,to be submitted to these registers as well as the ways in which third parties
are affected by publication. These rules related to the formalities of public
disclosure are supplemented by directives regulating the substantive
aspects of public disclosure, 24 including the methods used to prepare and
the contents of a corporation's or a group's annual report. 25 These direc-
tives on the substantive aspects of public disclosure are linked with the
directive dealing with the qualification requirements for annual report
auditors, 26 forming a compact system that has been implemented into Ger-
man law by the Accounting Directives Law, enacted in 1985.27
The area of internal disclosure is covered by the Directive on the
Duties of Disclosure on Acquisition of Shareholdings of 1988,28 known as
transparency directive. German stock corporation law stipulates that there
is a duty to disclose in the case of shareholding acquisitions of 25% and
50%. The transparency directive considerably extends this duty by requir-
ing disclosure in the event of shareholdings of 10%. Further transparency
directive threshold values are 25%, 50% and 75%. In contrast to the Ger-
man stock corporation law, however, this directive only affects corpora-
tions listed on the stock exchange. The directive was implemented into
German law in the Securities Trading Law of 1994.29
2. Internal Structure of Corporations
In addition to the establishment of uniform rules for public disclosure, reg-
ulations affecting the internal structure of corporations and their public
appearance have an important impact on the fabric of the uniform market.
Those dealing with corporations outside of their own country must know
how and with whom they can make contractual agreements. In a common
23. ABI. EG No. L 65 from 14.3.1968, at 8 fl.
24. Karl Gleichmann, Oberblick fiber neue Kooperationsformen und aber
Entwicklungen im Gesellschaftsrecht der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 33 AG (DIE
AKTnENGESELLSCHAFT) 159, 160 (1988).
25. 4. directive, ABI. EG (AMTSBLAr DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFEN) No. C 7
from 28.2.72., at 11 ff. and 7. directive, AB1. EG No. L 193 from 18.7.1983, at 1 ft.
26. 8. directive, AB1. EG No. L 126 from 12.5.84, at 20.
27. BiRiLiG (BILANZIUCHTLINIE-GEsErz) from 9.12.1985, BGB1. I (BUNDESGESErZBLATT
TEIL 1) 2355 (1985).
28. ABl. EG (AMTsBtATr DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN) No. L 348 from
17.12.1988, at 81 fl.
29. Securities Trading Law of 1994, §§ 21 ff. WpHG.
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market, the regulations on these issues must work in a homogeneous man-
ner. The very first corporate law directive, enacted in 1968,3 0 provided this
kind of certainty among contracting parties by recommending homogene-
ous standards for the definition of legal representation. As a result, limita-
tions on the powers of representation of executive management, acting
outside of the corporate purpose, and the failure to fulfill required formali-
ties when establishing a corporation, among others, are defenses available
against the claims of a third party in only very limited, exceptional cases.
The structure of corporations is also affected by the Directives on the
Transformation of Corporations of 197831 (the Third Corporation Direc-
tive) and the Directive on Splitting of 198232 (the Sixth Corporation Direc-
tive). Whereas the First and Second Corporation Directives were strongly
influenced by German corporate law, the directive dealing with mergers
and splits was primarily based on Roman law, and particularly on French
law models.33 Both aim at providing earlier protection for shareholders by
requiring an independent examination of intended mergers or splits.
Employee interests, in contrast, receive only very low-priority considera-
tion. Germany made use of the opportunity presented by these directives
to completely revise its largely outdated law in this field and passed the
Law Regulating Transformation of Corporations in 1994.34
Finally, the Second Corporation Directive is relevant to the internal
structure of corporations. It stipulates that state corporations must have a
uniform minimum level of capital resources and contains numerous provi-
sions that serve to ensure that the initial capital required when establishing
the corporation, and any later capital increases are in fact paid and that the
capital is actually received.35 This directive is in force, though only four of
the member states, among them Germany (since 1979),36 have to date
implemented it in national law. Breach of Treaty proceedings are currently
being taken against the remaining member states.37
3. Protection of Investors
A third area where harmonization of the law is necessary for a uniform
internal market is the protection afforded to investors. If corporations are
placed in a position to access equally the capital markets throughout
Europe, then the acquisition modalities laid down in the stock exchange
law and the regulations protecting future shareholders must offer the same
qualities throughout the Union. This has been accomplished by the Direc-
30. ABI. EG No. L 65 from 14.3.1968, at 8 fl.
31. ABI. EG No. L 295 from 20.10.1978, at 36 fl.
32. AB1. EG No. L 378 from 31.12.1982, at 47 fl.
33. See also the reasons for the Verschmelzungsrichlinie-Gesetz, BT-DRs. (DRUCK-
SACHE DES DEUTSCHEN BUNDEsTAGES) 9/1065, at 13.
34. From 28.10.1994, BGBL. I (BUNDESGESErZBLArr TEL I) 3210 (1994).
35. ABI. EG (AMTSBLATT DER EUROPAIScHEN GamriNscHAFrEN) No. L 26 from
31.1.1977, at 1 fl.
36. BGBI. II (BUNDESGEErZBLATT TaL I) 1959 (1978).
37. Gleichmann, supra note 28, at 161.
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tive on Admission of Securities to the Stock Exchange of 1979,38 the Direc-
tive on Prospectuses of 1980, 39 and the Directive on Semi-Annual Reports
of 1982.4 0 In addition, several proposals have been submitted to the Com-
mission dealing with subjects such as the question of issuing prospectuses,
the problems related to insider information and takeover offers, an area of
growing importance in Europe.
The main functions of the law governing transactions in capital mar-
kets are, of course, to ensure that the capital markets work efficiently and
to protect individual investors. Creditors are only protected to a very lim-
ited degree and minority shareholders essentially enjoy no protection. Cor-
porate law is far more suitable to deal with these issues. Within Europe,
there are, however, two fundamentally different approaches in this context.
On the continent, the interests protected by corporate law play a dominant
role, whereas in Great Britain, as in the United States, the interests of capi-
tal markets are given priority. A look at the economic situation in the two
regions quickly explains this contrast. In Germany, only 14.6% of all
households own shares. This figure is 29.6% in Great Britain. Market cap-
italization as a percentage of gross domestic product in Germany is
18.23%; in Great Britain it is 88.55%. Assuming that no significant short-
term changes alter these proportions, one can safely assert that there will
be no shift in Germany in the protection of investment capital from the
domain of corporate law to the laws regulating the capital market. A fur-
ther limitation in the scope of capital market law is that investor protection
only exists for publicly offered assets, and it is restricted to shares in public
corporations. The whole area of partnerships and limited liability corpora-
tions, particularly important in Germany, is only accounted for in a very
inadequate way.
4. Partnership Law
The law governing partnerships has been largely excluded from European
harmonization. This applies to both the harmonization efforts made by
the European Commission and the spontaneous steps toward harmoniza-
tion taken by courts and practitioners in the member states. In addition,
wherever attempts have been made, the results were, at best, ambivalent.
Harmonization in this field of law makes sense in order to avoid the effec-
tive exclusion of smaller and medium enterprises from the benefits of the
single market. In Germany those enterprises are mostly organized as part-
nerships. It can only be hoped that the Commission takes a closer look at
this area in the future.
38. ABI. EG (AMTSBLArr DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINScHATEN) No. L 66 from
16.3.1979, at 21 fl.
39. ABI. EG No. L 100 from 17.4.1980, at 1 fl.
40. ABI. EG No. L 48 from 20.2.1982, at 26 fl.
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IV. Interim Balance Sheet
An overview of corporate law in all of the EU member states reveals that
the activities of the European Community and the spontaneous harmoniza-
tion of laws between individual member states have already resulted in an
impressive degree of legal harmonization. However, there are still marked
differences in many important areas of the various national corporate laws
throughout the EU.
A. Harmony in the Corporate Law of the EU States
Several areas of correlation exist among the national corporate laws of EU
states. These include:
-The rules governing nominal, or stated, capital and its function as a secur-
ity for creditors are now largely the same throughout Europe. This is actu-
ally a remarkable achievement when we consider the fact that the concept
of fixed share capital, an idea which has prevailed in continental law for
over 100 years, did not exist at all in Great Britain. As a result, very funda-
mental changes have taken place in English law.
-The rules for rendering accounts, at least in so far as they pertain to the
protection of creditors and seek to prevent false disclosure of profits, are
now more or less the same in all member states. This also holds true for
the examination of annual financial statements and their public
disclosure.
-The powers of representation of executive management are almost identi-
cally defined in the member states. Again here, the changes made in Eng-
lish law, which followed the ultra vires principle, were particularly far-
reaching.
-The possibilities for merging and splitting corporations, vital elements of
entrepreneurial life, are also regulated in a comparable way throughout the
Union. In Germany, this meant a complete revision of the law of trans-
forming corporations.
-Finally, corporate law now permits single person corporations, and the
establishment of single person corporations is now to be ubiquitously
introduced in all member states. It should be noted that this directive has
not yet been implemented throughout Europe.
B. Differences Between National Laws
The remaining differences concern fundamental issues of corporate law,
making harmonization in these areas particularly difficult, requiring that
each member state carefully reviews its own position on the matters in
question. Presently, the following four areas are under consideration: 1)
the administration of stock corporations; 2) codetermination; 3) corporate
law relating to groups; and 4) international corporate law.
1. Administration of Stock Corporations
Within the European Union, there are various models for the administra-
tion of stock corporations. The dualistic system - based on an executive
board of management and a supervisory board of directors - is found in
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Swe-
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den. The monistic system - based on a single corporate directive organ -
prevails in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. France
introduced an optional model in 1966 and again in 1994 whereby there is
a choice available between the monistic system, its dualistic counterpart, or
the Socigtt par actions simplifiee, which offers a model more or less free of
contractual requirements.
A draft directive on corporate structure would attempt to harmonize
the articles of national stock corporations accross Europe by allowing these
corporations to choose between several options. Both the monistic and the
dualistic models are offered by the draft directive to structure the organs of
a corporation. The dualistic model then offers four separate variations for
the organization of codetermination, and three variations available under
the monistic model. I have serious doubts as to whether this variety of
choices really will bring about an equality of regulations.
2. Codetermination
The second area concerns the codetermination rights of employees. There
are extremely large differences of approach on this point within the EU. In
some countries, entrepreneurial employee codetermination in stock corpo-
rations is an integral part of corporate law. This phenomenon exists in
Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, though the regula-
tions vary greatly even within these countries. In France, Ireland, and Por-
tugal, partial aspects of codetermination are regulated by law. In Great
Britain, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, there are no regulations, although many
voluntary codetermination models exist in practice. In Belgium and
Greece, codetermination is not practiced at all.
Codetermination is practiced most extensively in Germany. Corpo-
rate law prescribes a one-third parity or half parity codetermination rela-
tionship, depending on the number of persons employed in the
corporation. Only businesses with less than 500 employees are exempted
by corporate law from practicing codetermination. However, in addition to
the codetermination prescribed by corporate law, primarily involving par-
ticipation at corporation supervisory board level, the Works Constitution
Law provides for an internal right of workers to both participate in the
decision-making process of the business and lodge complaints. This law
even affects comparatively small corporations.
With its wide range of options, the draft guideline on corporation
structures does not offer the prospect of accomplishing a harmonization in
this field, but, if passed, risks creating the illusion of harmonization.41 In
Germany, there are fears that corporations might "flee from the constraints
of codetermination;" Great Britain objects to the concept of setting the
rules of codetermination by law and considers this to contradict the long
tradition of relationships between workers and the representatives of capi-
tal. And indeed, the optional models offered in the most recent draft for
41. Klaus J. Hopt, Harmonisierung im europdischen Gesellschaftsrecht, 21 ZGR (ZEiT-
SCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT) 265, 279 (1992).
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the Statute of an European Stock Corporation read like a capitulation given
that the goal is to harmonize the existing differences in approach.
3. Corporate Law Relating to Groups
Clear differences also exist in the corporate laws relating to groups. Legis-
lation regulating this area has been passed, to date, only in Germany and
Portugal. Belgium also recently adopted legislation that covers some
aspects of the issues involved. A draft directive on the law relating to
groups has been on the table since 1984. However, it has not yet found
majority support within the Commission. In most member states, protec-
tion is afforded by the relevant regulations governing the capital market.
The disadvantage here, however, is that these only apply to corporations
traded on the stock exchange, or to publicly available shareholdings. Pro-
tection mechanisms relating to liability have been developed by judge-made
law, particularly in England and France.
Germany is one of the legal pioneers in the field of business combina-
tion law, and for a long time it was believed that it would develop into a
legal export article. This has not occurred. The reason why a standardiza-
tion of the law relating to group businesses has not taken hold is due to
fundamental differences in understanding among the various member
states, and this should give cause for Germany to reconsider its position on
the issues involved.
The law relating to groups in Germany is based on the fiction that a
business taking part in a group is independent. This independence can
only be restricted in the ways laid down in the law relating to groups, and
these assume a balancing out of any disadvantages incurred through
restriction. The concept envisages that such compensation is primarily
regulated in a contract between the corporations involved, which outlines
in a transparent manner any existing relationship of dependency. How-
ever, the functioning of real groups without a contractual basis makes it
very clear that the concept of independence upon which the law is based is,
indeed, a fiction. The prime interest of a group, its perspective of the entire
operations and not only of individual parts, gets lost in the German focus
on protecting minority shareholders and creditors.
The German system, based as it is on a group contract, is unique. In
most EU member states, the concept of prescribing a contractual relation-
ship to regulate the relationship of the corporation to the group is consid-
ered to be an unnecessary prescription that is, in its very nature, foreign to
the business possibilities available to a group.42 The liability system in
German law is also predominantly considered to be too rigid in the other
countries of the EU. In comparison, French law more readily takes
account of managerial breaches of duties of conduct. A majority share-
holder who exerts influence on the management organs of a dependent
42. Yves Guyon, Examens critiques des projets europeens en matiere de groupes de
socidt~s (le point de vuefran~ais), in GRouPs OF COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAWS 155, 164
(Klaus J. Hopt ed., 1982).
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corporation is liable as dirgeant defait to compensate for any excessive debt
incurred due to the influence of that shareholder. 43 Legal transactions
conducted jointly by parent and daughter corporations (unit6 en apparence)
can give rise to liability under the principles of prima facie entitlement. 44
Similar rules are found in English law.
4. International Corporate Law
The area of law concerned with groups is closely related to international
corporate law. The beginning of this Article referred to the existence of
several opposing theories relating to the question of recognition of corpora-
tions. These theories have particular significance in relation to the transfer
of a corporation's principal place of business across borders.
The foundation theory is based on the assumption that a corporation
formed according to the laws of a state will be recognized as a body pos-
sessing legal personality for the entire duration of its existence and that it
will still be recognized as such even if it moves its registered place of busi-
ness out of the state in which it was founded. If all states in the European
Union followed the foundation theory, corporations would be free to move
without restrictions within the Union (except in relation to taxation rules).
However, under place of registration regimes, corporations must fulfill the
requirements for registration of the state in which the principal place of
business is located. If the law in all states in the Union were based on the
place of registration theory, then it would no longer be possible to speak of
the freedom of movement for corporations, because corporations transfer-
ring their place of business across borders would have to re-establish them-
selves in their new location. Yet, each theory has a number of adherents in
the EU. The foundation theory is practiced in various forms in Denmark,
Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and, in a restricted
form, in Spain. The place of registration theory is practiced in Germany,
Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, and Luxembourg.
The arguments supporting the place of registration theory can be
reduced to one point: corporations that have not fulfilled the requirements
for establishment in a state should be prevented from becoming operative
in that state; regulations concerning the establishment and administration
of corporations in other states are not considered to be of equal value to the
state's own national laws. In relation to non-EU states, this concern
regarding the place of registration may be justified. Yet, the situation
within the European Union is different. Corporate laws in the Union have
now become so similar in so many areas that one can safely assume that
the laws regulating the establishment and administration of corporations
are of equal value.
43. Jean Nicolas Druey, Das deutsche Konzernrecht aus der Sicht des fibrigen Europa,
in KONZERNRECHT IM AusLAND 310, 319 (Marcus Lutter ed., 1994).
44. Yves Guyon, Das Recht der Gesellschaftergruppe in Frankreich, in id. at 76, 90;
Druey, supra note 47, at 317; Frank Woolridge, Aspects of the Regulation of Groups of
Companies in European Laws, in EuROPEAN COMPANY LAws: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
103, 116 (Robert R. Drury & Peter G. Xuereb eds., 1991).
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Harmonization of the rules for regulating the conflict of corporate
laws in line with the foundation theory is necessary within the European
Union. As previously explained, several basic differences concerning cor-
porate law exist, and they are currently preventing consensus on the matter
in Europe. The transfer from the place of registration theory to the founda-
tion theory, therefore, could be qualified in the following way: as long as the
basic differences exist, the receiving states must take these differences into
account in the case of a cross-border transfer of the place of registration.
This primarily concerns the issue of codetermination. Until laws are har-
monized, the imperative regulations of each state of the (new) location
must prevail. This forms the subject-matter of the so-called "overlapping
theory," which is a modification of the foundation theory. For example, if
an English public limited company transfers its place of registration to Ger-
many, then it should be immediately recognized as a corporate body; its
English internal organization should also be recognized. However, as far as
codetermination laws are concerned, the statute of the organization of the
corporation - its Memorandum of Association - must conform to Ger-
man regulations. Re-establishment would then be no longer necessary on
a transfer of its place of registration. Only corresponding modification of
its statute is required.45
Conclusion
Corporate law in Europe is heading down the right path. If a truly uniform
internal market is to be achieved, a framework of laws for the organization
of businesses that has a neutral impact on their competitive situation must
be created. A high degree of standardization of laws has already been
achieved in the area of corporate law in the European Union. The differ-
ences that remain are based on different national attitudes and the political
consensus that prevails in the individual states. The path to a fully uni-
form market is becoming increasingly steep and rocky. In order to tackle
the next steps, all of the European states must rid themselves of some of
the weight they continue to carry around with them. This is difficult and
requires a high level of willingness to compromise. I, however, trust in the
ability of lawyers and politicians to reason, and I am confident that we will
achieve a truly European corporate law in the future.
45. This closely corresponds with the Spanish practice of law.

